But if you ask Las Vegas locals to describe Lerner in 3 words or less, most likely you will hear them refer to Lerner as “The Heavy Hitter.” Sometime in 2001, Lerner began promoting himself as “The Heavy Hitter.” While the ad campaign certainly grabbed the attention of the Las Vegas public, it also got the attention of the State Bar of Nevada, who told Lerner that calling himself “The” Heavy Hitter was false and misleading because it’s a statement that he is the only heavy hitter. Instead, the Nevada Bar told Lerner that he could only be “a” heavy hitter. Click here for a Las Vegas Review Journal article on the “heavy hitter” dispute between Lerner and the State Bar of Nevada.
Now Lerner finds himself in the midst of another dispute over the “heavy hitter” moniker – but this time it’s a trademark dispute with a company with which Lerner (apparently up until recently) had a licensing arrangement to use the name HEAVY HITTER. Lerner has apparently refused to pay the agreed-upon licensing fee and is now challenging the company’s trademark rights in court.
On August 22, 2008, Lerner filed a declaratory judgment action against Richard Sackett, LawCo USA, PLLC (“LawCo”), and Group Matrix, Inc. (“Group Matrix”) (collectively, the “Defendants”) in the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada. See Lerner v. Sackett et al, Case No. 08-cv-01123 (D. Nev.). A copy of the complaint can be downloaded here.
According to the complaint, LawCo and Group Matrix are both advertising agencies purportedly owned and operated by Sackett. LawCo is the named registrant of the registered trademark HEAVY HITTERS for legal services, which it filed on April 3, 2001 as an intent-to-use application and registered on February 1, 2005. Several months after this first application was filed, Sackett himself on August 22, 2001 filed an intent-to-use trademark application for the mark HEAVY HITTERS for advertising, management, and marketing of legal services (later amended to business management, marketing, and advertising services specifically for the legal services of others). The application has been allowed, but no Statement of Use has yet been filed by Sackett.
At first, without knowing anything about LawCo or Sackett, one might think that the two applications and applicants were completely unrelated. Indeed, the attorney of record for Sackett’s application in the Office Action Response filed June 11, 2002 had to argue no likelihood of confusion in response to the PTO’s citation to LawCo’s then pending application. But after the PTO maintained its likelihood of confusion rejection over LawCo’s HEAVY HITTERS mark after it registered, Sackett’s counsel submitted a Declaration stating that Sackett is the “general manager and controls the activities of LawCo USA, P.L.L.C. Corporation.” As such, this makes LawCo and Sackett “related entities” and therefore, the PTO withdrew the likelihood of confusion rejection.
Lerner’s lawsuit seeks a declaratory judgment that his use of the HEAVY HITTER and HEAVY HITTERS marks for legal services does not infringe Defendants’ trademark rights in its Heavy Hitter Marks.
According to Lerner’s complaint, sometime in 2002, Lerner entered into some kind of license agreement with the Defendants to allow Lerner to use the mark HEAVY HITTER in the advertising and promotion of Lerner’s legal practice. [Note: The complaint states that Lerner “attempted” to enter into an agreement, but other parts of the complaint, notably those asking for the agreement to be rescinded, suggest that an actual agreement was indeed entered into by the parties.] At the time, the Defendants claimed trademark rights to the marks HEAVY HITTER and HEAVY HITTERS for use in connection with legal services was based on the above trademark applications. The Defendants have apparently entered into other license agreements with other third party legal service providers to use its Heavy Hitter Marks.
Lerner argues that the Defendants fraudulently induced him to enter into the agreement based upon a misrepresentation that Defendants held legitimate trademark rights in the Heavy Hitter Marks. [Comment—An intent-to-use application by an applicant with a bona fide intent to use the mark does provide the applicant with legitimate inchoate trademark rights]. Lerner further argues that the Defendants do not provide legal services in connection with the Heavy Hitter Marks nor can they provide such services because they are not licensed attorneys capable of providing legal services. [Comment—“legal services” is a pretty broad category and doesn’t necessarily mean the “practice of law” and Defendants controlled license of the marks constitutes use].
Lerner also claims that Defendants lost their trademark rights by not exercising any quality control over Lerner’s legal services or over any legal services offered by another other third party licensees of the Heavy Hitter Marks. [Comment—My favorite defense – the “naked license”].
Lerner apparently received a cease and desist letter from the Defendants on or around August 14, 2008, threatening suit if he did not stop using the Heavy Hitter Marks, thereby leading to Lerner’s reasonable apprehension that Defendants will file legal action against him and the basis for his seeking declaratory relief.
Based on Defendants’ fraud and naked license, Lerner argues that Defendants have no trademark rights in the Heavy Hitter Marks and thus his use of the marks HEAVY HITTER and HEAVY HITTERS cannot constitute federal or state trademark infringement or unfair competition. Lerner seeks a declaration that his use of the mark HEAVY HITTER or HEAVY HITTERS does not infringe Defendant’s registered trademark, is not likely to cause confusion as to source, origin or affiliation or otherwise constitute unfair competition with Defendants trademark rights, and does not constitute trademark infringement or unfair competition under Nevada state law.
For good measure, Lerner also seeks cancellation of Defendant’s registered HEAVY HITTER mark on the grounds of abandonment and fraud on the USPTO. Lerner argues that the Defendants have abandoned the mark because they have not used the mark in commerce in connection with legal services since the application was filed in 2001. [Comment—what about use by a licensee, such as Lerner?] While not stated very clearly, the complaint also seems to be alleging that since the Defendant never used the mark in commerce, then the Defendants committed fraud on the USPTO when it claimed in its Statement of Use filed August 18, 2003 that it began using the mark at least as early as January 5, 1999. [Practice Pointer: Allegations of fraud on the PTO should be specifically identified. If you want to play the “fraud” card, make sure your complaint specifically identifies the false statement of material fact that the trademark applicant knew or should have known was false at the time and make sure you allege that the PTO relied upon such false statement in issuing the trademark registration.]
Finally, Lerner throws in a claim of common law fraud based on Defendants’ false representation that the Defendants had legitimate rights to the Heavy Hitter Marks, knowledge that its representation was false (i.e., Defendants knew that they were not offering legal services in connection with the Heavy Hitter Marks or were not exercising any quality control over any licensees of such marks), and detrimental reliance on the part of Lerner with respect to those false representations (but for the false representation, he would not have entered into the license agreement with the Defendants). Lerner requests that the “agreement” be rescinded by the court, and thus, Lerner’s use of the Heavy Hitter or Heavy Hitters mark could not be a breach of contract.
The prosecution history of the registered trademark application for HEAVY HITTER would give any reasonable person grounds for questioning the legitimacy of the trademark rights thereunder. After filing the application as an intent-to-use application on April 3, 2001, the application sailed through and received a Notice of Allowance on March 5, 2002. All LawCo had to do was file a Statement of Use or Extension of Time within six months. But for reasons unknown, the due date (September 5, 2002) passed. On October 10, 2002, LawCo filed the Extension Request along with a Petition to Revive the application (having missed the due date for filing such Extension Request). After the Extension Request was granted, LawCo had until March 5, 2003 to file a Statement of Use or additional Extension Request. So what happened? The due date once again came and went without any timely filing. On March 27, 2003, the applicant once again filed the Extension Request that should have been filed along with a second Petition to Revive. This extended the time for LawCo to file a Statement of Use or additional Extension Request to September 5, 2003.
On August 18, 2003, Lawco finally submitted its Statement of Use, but oddly claiming first use as early as January 5, 1999, and attaching a telephone lawyer advertisement for a personal injury law firm in Rochester, NY named Alexander & Catalano which boldly proclaimed “Call The Heavy Hitters!” [Query—If the mark had really been in use since January 5, 1999, how come LawCo couldn’t come up with a specimen of use in a timely manner – and how come LawCo had to file the application originally as intent-to-use?]
Because the drawing of the mark submitted with the application is for HEAVY HITTERS and the specimen showed “Call The Heavy Hitters!” the PTO rejected the specimen and demanded a substitute specimen showing the mark as depicted in the drawing. In response, LawCo apparently provided a CD of “‘Heavy Hitter’ commercials” that were in use prior to the date the Statement of Use was filed and argued that they reflected use of the “HEAVY HITTERS” mark as an “attention-getting symbol” which would be recognized as a service mark.
Well, based on the PTO’s final action in response to the CD, the ads apparently showed the mark HEAVY HITTER and THE HEAVY HITTER [Ed.-Hmmm, I wonder whose ads those were?] which still differed from the original drawing of the mark HEAVY HITTERS submitted with the application. The Examining Attorney allowed LawCo to amend the drawing to HEAVY HITTER so that it conformed to the specimen (apparently not finding such a change to be a material alteration of the essence or character of the mark). And with that, LawCo finally got its service mark registration.
As questionable as the prosecution of the application appears to be, there may not be enough of a false statement of material fact in the Statement of Use to kill the registration on the basis of fraud (the stated dates of use, while certainly questionable, will not be deemed material so long as the mark was used in connection with the services as of the date the Statement of Use was filed). Lerner could try to argue that the Defendants never had a bona fide intent to use the mark in commerce, but that may be difficult given the licensing arrangement entered into between the Defendants and Lerner in 2002.
As for abandonment, ownership rights in a trademark or service mark may be acquired and maintained through the use of the mark by a controlled licensee even when the only use of the mark has been made, and is being made, by the licensee. See Turner v. HMH Publishing Co., Inc., 380 F.2d 224, 229, 154 USPQ 330, 334 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1006, 156 USPQ 720 (1967).
Of course, the key word in the above is “controlled” licensee, which comes back to what may be the best argument for Lerner’s abandonment defense -- the apparent “naked license.” If Lerner can show evidence that Defendants have not, nor have they ever, taken any reasonable steps to monitor the quality of the services rendered by Lerner and other licensees, then such failure to ensure quality control can result in the trademark ceasing to function as a symbol of quality and a controlled source in which case the trademark will be deemed to have been abandoned and the Defendants would be estopped from asserting rights to the mark.
For what it’s worth, when I think of the “Heavy Hitter,” only one “source” comes to mind.